High Ambition Leadership

Published:September 15, 2011
Author:Martha Lagace

What is welcome and all too rare? Leaders who care about building great institutions, not just profits. What sets these leaders apart in their practice and outlook?

Harvard Business School's Michael Beer in his new book, Higher Ambition: How Great Leaders Create Economic and Social Value, examines how CEOs from major companies around the globe—Becton Dickinson, IKEA, Tata Group—made a positive difference for their employees, their customers, their community, and society while not neglecting profits. Beer cowrote the book with Russell Eisenstat, Nathaniel Foote (Harvard MBA'81/JD'82), Tobias Fredberg, and Flemming Norrgren.

"The world of business has been governed by an implicit leadership model," Beer explains. "With the exception of a minority of CEOs, however—those we interviewed and others like them—the purpose of the firm is defined by a single-minded focus on return on financial and physical assets, not creating social value."

Higher-ambition leaders, as the authors call them, also make decisions about long-term relationships with all their stakeholders in mind. "Consider United Stationers' strategy of 'enabling our partners to succeed,' or Becton Dickinson's concern with creating healthy lives, not just profits, from its medical products. Higher-ambition leaders craft a distinctive set of practices, outlined in our book, to enact the multiple stakeholder perspective."

In addition to being the Cahners-Robb Professor of Business Administration, Emeritus, at HBS, Beer serves as chairman of the consultancy TruePoint Partners and of its educational and research institute, the TruePoint Center for Higher Ambition Leadership. In the e-mail interview that follows, Beer talks about the book and what boards and business schools can do to cultivate higher-ambition leaders.

Martha Lagace: What is missing in leadership models today?

Michael Beer: Most formal leadership models do not incorporate institution-building in their definition of leadership. Leadership is thought of as a means for activating change, employee engagement and motivation, ethical behavior, improvement processes of one kind or another, innovation, and so on. With a few notable exceptions—including Jim Collins's work on "Level Five" leaders, and the treatment of leadership both in my previous book, High Commitment, High Performance, and in Higher Ambition—however, there are few leadership models that explicitly address the leaders' role in building a "great institution": one that does "well" (produces financial results) and "good" (contributes to the larger good).

Q: Who are higher-ambition leaders?

A: In our book we explicitly selected leaders who defined their purpose as creating economic and social value. The goal of the corporation is to add value to employees, customers, suppliers and other partners, and community/society. These CEOs and the companies they lead make decisions with the interests of these other constituencies in mind. Higher-ambition leaders are concerned with long-term relationships, not transactional relationships where immediate price (for employees, salary) and cost are the only factors in decisions.

Q: You and your coauthors spoke with 36 CEOs based on three continents. Why did you choose these particular people to study?

A: We started out to find outliers: CEOs who produced outstanding economic and social value. Every successful CEO produces the first, but too few frame the purpose of their firm or behave in a way that illustrates their concern with social value. So we had two criteria that CEOs and their companies had to meet.

The CEOs we chose to study must have had a compounded annual growth rate in revenues, profits, and market capitalization that exceeded the 50th percentile of industry peers between 1997 and 2006 or for the CEO's tenure. Corresponding figures were used for public or privately held companies. There was evidence from the public record—articles, speeches, and views from those with direct knowledge—that the CEO was concerned with developing a people-centric, high commitment culture.

In effect, we searched for CEOs who were leading high commitment, high performance companies like those I described in my previous book. They were successfully creating commitment to the firm and its purpose in all their stakeholders. We wanted to take a deep dive into how these CEOs thought, spoke, and described their stewardship of the company.

I want to emphasize that in no way did we set out to prove a relationship between the practices of these CEOs and financial performance. There is already ample evidence to support this. We wanted to understand what this model of leadership looks like close up.

Q: One key to success is that these leaders align strategy and organization instead of treating them as separate realms. How do higher-ambition leaders align strategy and organization?

A: The CEOs we interviewed align strategy and organization by first and foremost developing and defining the direction of the company in a different way than do most CEOs and companies. They began the search for what markets to serve and what products or services to offer by first looking inside. Contrary to most companies that begin by looking at markets and competition, these CEOs looked inside to define "who" the company was—where was the most powerful intersection between their company's capabilities and purpose and the passions of their people with marketplace opportunity. These CEOs spent a great deal of time crystallizing their values and purpose and how strategy could be defined in a way that integrated strategy with values.

In this way the animating beliefs of the leaders, the employees, and the company's strategy were aligned. It was what we call in the book "forging strategic identity." Sometimes, usually with startups, this is done at the beginning of the CEO's tenure. In other instances this way of thinking develops over time. This process is often accompanied by divestment and sale of businesses that the company should not have entered in the first place.

The example we use in the book is Nokia. Consultants from a leading strategy consulting firm had recommended that Nokia should absolutely not be in the cell phone business. (Nokia already had engineers and resources for this but they were underdeveloped.) Nokia's CEO knew, however, that the passion and capabilities of the company lay in its cell phone business, and that there was a unique market opportunity to transform [cell phones] from an expensive tool for the rich to an affordable and transformative tool for communications in both developing and more mature economies. He sold off many other unrelated businesses to successfully focus on this one, with remarkable success until very recently.

Having forged an identity that defines strategy and the company's animating beliefs and values, higher-ambition leaders work hard to enroll everyone in this strategic direction through a variety of practices. They spend an enormous amount of time engaging their employees in communicating and further refining the company's strategic identity. Val Gooding, then the CEO of BUPA in the United Kingdom, gave talks and encouraged much discussion of the company's direction in many locations over a long period. Peter Sands at Standard Chartered Bank worked with his immediate leadership team to define the bank's values and strategic direction and then engaged his top 300 staff in the same process. Ed Ludwig, CEO of Becton Dickinson, appointed a task force to interview 250 key staff about the company's strengths and barriers to achieving a new direction.

This engagement enabled our leaders to:

  • forge demanding goals to which people were committed;
  • create a community of shared purpose, one in which people are committed to the larger good of the company as opposed to their department or themselves;
  • hire people whose values and skills fit the culture and strategy, thus reinforcing and sustaining the community of purpose.

In addition, leaders spend a great deal of time on leadership development. In the case of former Campbell Soup CEO Doug Conant, he taught in a leadership course that he had designed for the company's high-potential managers. In all cases, higher-ambition leaders identified future leaders and developed them—usually through cross-functional and cross-geographic career paths.

Q: How does someone earn the right to lead? What personal attributes were crucial among the leaders you have studied?

A: There is no substitute for leaders personally meeting employees. Leif Johansson, CEO of the Volvo Group in Sweden, did a lot of that when he took charge. He made an important decision to locate headquarters where most of the employees in Sweden were. Russ Fradin, of Hewitt Associates, said that early in his tenure he spent three-quarters of his time going around. I think he met with 72 clients in the first 100 days, just hearing what they had to say.

Making yourself vulnerable increases trust and commitment. When Becton Dickinson's Ludwig owned up to his responsibility for problems with a multimillion-dollar IT system brought to him by a task force he had commissioned to speak truth to power, and then outlined his commitment to fix the problem, he earned trust. In one way or another, the CEOs we studied were able to engender trust by holding themselves accountable publicly.

Q: Your book analyzes leaders primarily in public for-profit companies. What is different about being a higher-ambition leader at a public or private firm?

A: Private company leaders have a great deal more freedom to take a long-term view of the firm. There is substantial evidence for this: see Danny Miller and Isabelle Le Breton-Miller's book Managing for the Long Run: Lessons in Competitive Advantage from Great Family Businesses. These leaders also start with the motivation to leave a legacy and build an institution, something that does not come as easily to public company leaders, with the exception of the higher-ambition-type leaders we studied.

Public company leaders have the constraints of capital market expectations for short-term quarterly earnings. They live in a world in which the conventional but incorrect wisdom is that their exclusive purpose is to produce ever-higher shareholder returns. So it is the extraordinary leader who has the courage to break out of that frame and define a higher ambition. The public company leader simply has more headwind and therefore needs more conviction, skills, and courage to fashion and execute against a higher-ambition agenda.

Q: Many companies in your book have a global reach. At the same time, however, they are often connected to a local identity or home base. How do higher-ambition leaders view culture? How do they treat culture as an asset?

A: Some of the companies in our sample had developed a strong, locally oriented culture. Examples include Cummins and Herman Miller. Their respective cultures were rooted in the values of the small towns in which they were headquartered. Building a global culture required reshaping the culture around a broader set of values that would attract and motivate a diverse global community.

The challenge, of course, was to create a community of shared values and purpose from a much more diverse set of people ethnically, religiously, nationally, and so on. The leaders did this by developing an identity with a common mission and a set of human values that everyone could connect with. People around the world value trust, want meaning out of work, and want to do good and well. In the example of Standard Chartered Bank, people from a diverse set of countries and backgrounds could relate to and become committed to the goal of dramatically reducing preventable blindness worldwide. United Stationers, not in our sample but a higher-ambition company, has been able to use higher purpose to do good: Employees want to help others through community projects they define and work on together. And by collaborating around "worthy" community projects, employees team up better around business issues.

Q: Boards and business schools, for different reasons, do not cultivate higher-ambition leaders. How should they?

A: Boards need to begin to change their frame for how they evaluate management and firm effectiveness. They should be asking their CEO what kind of an institution they are building. Does the CEO and the firm have a higher purpose? What is she or he doing to create a healthy institution that can deliver long-term and sustainable success? Boards should spend time assessing whether the CEO has created a strategic identity, a community of shared values, and trust-based relationships with employees, customers, community, and investors. Boards often do not ask the right questions about these things nor have the data to know if it is happening.

In a recent article in Directorship magazine, Nathaniel Foote and I suggest that boards need to create mechanisms for learning the truth about what is going on in the firm. Consider how things might have gone differently for some failed firms like Washington Mutual and Lehman Brothers if the boards had insight into the prevailing culture and the leader.

Business schools are teaching ethics and corporate social responsibility, but they do not teach these subjects in the context of building a higher-ambition or a high commitment, high performance firm. Students learn about finance and organizational behavior, for example, without ever learning how to integrate these and many other disciplines (marketing, operations, etc.) into a coherent, internally consistent set of practices that collectively reinforce a higher- ambition mission. If financial considerations require cost cutting, what should be the stance of the company toward layoffs if management also aspires to develop commitment from employees? If the company strategy calls for rapid growth, can this be done without diluting the higher-ambition culture? If you are trying to develop such a culture, rapid growth makes it harder to find people who fit the culture and possess the capabilities needed. And business schools, with the exception of a few like Harvard Business School, do not ask students to reflect on their values and define who they are and then help them see how these values relate to decisions they make about strategy, performance measurement, growth, and so on.

In short, business schools, as we argue in the book, do not teach integrity. By integrity we mean learning about (1) how different disciplines must be integrated with each other and higher-ambition purpose and values, and (2) how students' espoused higher-ambition values are reflected in decisions and actions they recommend should be taken in marketing, strategy, and finance. What business schools need is a course that teaches students how to think and act to build a higher-ambition firm.

Q: What are you working on next?

A: If business is to regain the legitimacy that it has lost in the last 20 years, and particularly since the 2008-2009 economic meltdown, we must change the leadership and management paradigm. We need to widen the circle of leaders who "get" higher ambition. My colleagues and I have committed ourselves to this mission. We have founded the TruePoint Center for Higher Ambition Leadership, a not-for-profit educational and research institute that will bring together higher-ambition leaders from around the world to learn from each other's experience. It will also offer leadership development programs for the next generation of leaders, as well as conduct research about what it takes to manage in a higher-ambition way.

Book Excerpt from Higher Ambition: How Great Leaders Create Economic and Social Value

Val Gooding's experience and approach to collective leadership is particularly instructive. Over the twelve years from her arrival at BUPA in 1996 to her retirement in 2008, she led a remarkable transformation of both the economic performance and the social institution. Gooding oversaw a rise in revenues from £1 billion to more than £5 billion, and she and her team worked to reconfigure the business portfolio. When she arrived, BUPA was a provider of health insurance and owner and operator of hospitals, with most of its revenue coming from the United Kingdom. When Gooding departed, BUPA had sold its hospitals, positioned itself in several growth segments of the health market, and generated 50 percent of its revenues from overseas markets.

When BUPA recruited Gooding as managing director for its U.K. business, the core health insurance business was in a perilous state. BUPA was losing market share, and the company's profits had been dropping. Gooding suggested, with a bit of humor, that she might not have taken the job had she realized that the organization was in such a mess. … [S]he acknowledged: "I probably should have done more research. The core business wasn't making any money. The customer service was poor. In my first few weeks, three or four of the senior managers came in and said, 'Oh, we're glad you've come because this will need sorting out. And oh, by the way, if you can't sort it out, we're all leaving.' "

The organization could not continue as it was; it simply would not have had the resources to sustain its operations. Yet, BUPA was an unusual organization: it is a provident association with no shareholders (BUPA stands for British Untied Provident Association). Any profits are reinvested in the business. So, because there are no shareholders to protest, the deteriorating finances did not bring corresponding external pressures to improve results. There was no "burning platform" from the threat of takeover that might have provoked a turnaround, as it would, for example, in a publicly owned company. BUPA's employees were not even particularly sure that profits really mattered to the organization. As Gooding characterized it, "If you had asked people in BUPA, 'So do we have to make a profit?' you have gotten a hundred different answers."

To make any change in the business, therefore, and to rescue it from almost certain extinction, leadership had to provide both the urgency and the direction needed to get people engaged and in gear. Gooding and her team had to help forty-five thousand people throughout the organization understand the urgency of improved financial performance and customer service. To do so—in an effort of several years—they did a number of things to sharpen the company's focus on performance, both financial and operational. They created more rigorous financial accountability at all levels of management. They instituted an incentive scheme that gave employees a financial stake in the performance of the business. They invested in IT systems and other tools to improve the ability of frontline call-center workers to deliver superior customer service. They put in place measures of customer satisfaction in every part of the business and set targets and rewarded based on those targets. "Our model is that if we do a good job for our customers, they will recommend us to others, and they will become our advocates," Gooding said. "It will become a circle, and so we will be able to deliver reasonable returns on the investments in our assets. And then we will be able to grow and deliver more health care to more people."

But what was most distinctive was the extent to which Gooding galvanized the turnaround by seeking to change the culture: she invested in leadership and personally modeled the new leadership behaviors. She sought to instill a performance ethic and a customer service orientation, not just by the new metrics and systems, but by drawing out the best in people and tapping their own higher aspirations. Gooding told us: "In terms of changing the culture, I had the chance to do everything I believe in. Either they work or not. That is the job of being chief executive. Fortunately, they did work." She was quick to point out, however, that the approach depended on high-quality leadership throughout the organization. …

It's not that Gooding actually had a great team when she arrived. As we've noted, a good number of them were ready to bolt. Gooding made it a priority to assemble a high-quality senior team and, further, to personally invest the time and energy in creating healthy relationships and building the trust needed for a cohesive, effective team. Gooding also made a major commitment to creating alignment, developing capabilities, and building commitment within the extended leadership group.

In her level of commitment to building collective leadership at both these levels, she was typical of most of our higher-ambition leaders.

 

Excerpted with permission of Harvard Business Review Press. Copyright © 2011 TruePoint LLC. From Higher Ambition: How Great Leaders Create Economic and Social Value by Michael Beer, Russell Eisenstat, Nathaniel Foote, Tobias Fredberg, and Flemming Norrgren.

About the Author: Martha Lagace, a student in Boston, is former senior editor of HBS Working Knowledge.

Ethnic Innovation and US Multinational Firm Activity

Published:September 14, 2011
Paper Released:August 2011
Authors:C. Fritz Foley and William R. Kerr

Executive Summary:

What effects do immigrant scientists and engineers have on the global activities of the firms that employ them? To what extent do these high-skilled immigrants help US multinationals capitalize on foreign opportunities? Professors Foley and Kerr analyze key data concerning US patents, direct investment abroad, research and development, and the ownership structure of firms. They show that immigration enhances the competitiveness of US multinationals. Taken together, the results have implications for immigration policies. Many debates about immigration focus on the potentially deleterious impact of low wage immigrants on the domestic workforce. However, Foley and Kerr point out that immigrants who are skilled enough to engage in innovative activity generate benefits for firms that are seeking to do business abroad. Key concepts include:

  • Immigrant scientists and engineers enhance the competitiveness of U.S. multinational firms in their home countries.
  • The input of ethnic innovators makes the input of local partners less valuable and lowers entry barriers to foreign countries. U.S. multinationals are more likely to enter foreign countries with wholly-owned subsidiaries, as opposed to partially-owned ones, with the domestic support of immigrant scientists and engineers.
  • Firms with more innovative activity performed by inventors of a certain ethnicity are more likely to conduct R&D and patenting in countries associated with that ethnicity. There is a particularly sharp rise in collaborative R&D that utilizes inventor teams spanning the United States and foreign countries.

Abstract

This paper studies the impact that immigrant innovators have on the global activities of U.S. firms by analyzing detailed data on patent applications and on the operations of the foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms. The results indicate that increases in the share of a firm's innovation performed by inventors of a particular ethnicity are associated with increases in the share of that firm's affiliate activity in their native countries. Ethnic innovators also appear to facilitate the disintegration of innovative activity across borders and to allow U.S. multinationals to form new affiliates abroad without the support of local joint venture partners. Thus, this paper points out that immigration can enhance the competitiveness of multinational firms.

Paper Information

First Look: September 13

HBS Cases: Lady Gaga

Lady Gaga is a huge international star, but just a few years ago the performer and her agent, Troy Carter, were making decisions that, if the wrong ones, could have short-circuited her career. In the new case "Lady Gaga," Anita Elberse and Michael Christensen tell the story from the manager's perspective. "The case provides rich insights into the artist's touring, recorded-music, and social-media activities, as well as supporting economic data," according to the authors. (Harvard Business School Working Knowledge will later this month publish a story on the case.)

Are they really "independent" directors?

They're called independent directors, but are they really? A forthcoming article in Management Science offers proof that companies appoint independents who are "overly sympathetic to management." In "Hiring Cheerleaders: Board Appointments of 'Independent' Directors," Lauren Cohen, Andrea Frazzini, and Christopher J. Malloy study boards that nominated former sell-side Wall Street analysts to be on their boards—analysts who actually covered the companies earlier in their careers. The researchers find that boards often nominate analysts who are overly bullish about the company's performance and who are not particularly star performers themselves.

When money is not the best motivator

How should NGOs and other nonprofit organizations motivate volunteers to do their best work? A new working paper finds that nonfinancial rewards are more effective than money. In "No Margin, No Mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for Pro-Social Tasks," the researchers look at the efforts of volunteers in Zambia tasked with delivering information to local residents about female condoms. The analysis finds that nonfinancial rewards were more effective at eliciting effort than either financial gain or a volunteer contract. The most effective enticements promote effort of volunteers both by leveraging intrinsic motivation for the cause and by facilitating social comparison with their peers. Research by Nava Ashraf, Oriana Bandiera, and Kelsey Jack.

— Sean Silverthorne

Publications

Higher Ambition: How Great Leaders Create Economic and Social Value

Authors:Michael Beer, Russel A. Eisenstat, Nathaniel Foote, Tobias Fredberg, and Flemming Norrgren
Publication:Harvard Business Press, 2011
Abstract

Organizations must choose between people and profits, right? Wrong, argue the authors of Higher Ambition. In fact, as global competition stiffens and enterprises face increasing public scrutiny, successful leaders must win on all fronts-with their people, their customers, their communities, and their shareholders. Higher Ambition takes you inside the minds of some of the most successful and insightful leaders of our time, the CEOs from companies as diverse as Standard Chartered Bank, Infosys, Nokia, Cummins, IKEA, Tata, and Campbell's Soup. The authors reveal how these leaders from around the world are converging on a new management paradigm that unlocks the energy and potential of their people to deliver superior economic and social value.

Book: http://hbr.org/product/higher-ambition-how-great-leaders-create-economic-/an/12957-HBK-ENG

The Culture Cycle: How to Shape the Unseen Force That Transforms Performance

Author:James Heskett
Publication:FT Press, 2011
Abstract

The contribution of culture to organizational performance is both substantial and quantifiable. This book presents the results of field research that demonstrates how an effective culture can account for up to half of the differential in performance between organizations in the same business. The book describes a conceptual framework, "the culture cycle," for managing culture that comprises setting and meeting expectations; establishing trust, engagement, and ownership among employees and customers that makes possible the successful implementation of policies and practices creating a learning and innovative organization; and tracking results in terms of the "four Rs" of retention, referrals, returns to labor, and relationships with customers. It shows "the culture cycle" at work in practice based on data collected for the study.

Book: http://www.ftpress.com/store/product.aspx?isbn=0132779781

Hiring Cheerleaders: Board Appointments of 'Independent' Directors

Authors:Lauren Cohen, Andrea Frazzini, and Christopher J. Malloy
Publication:Management Science (forthcoming)
Abstract

We provide evidence that firms appoint independent directors who are overly sympathetic to management, while still technically independent according to regulatory definitions. We explore a subset of independent directors for whom we have detailed, micro-level data on their views regarding the firm prior to being appointed to the board: sell-side analysts who are subsequently appointed to the boards of companies they previously covered. We find that boards appoint overly optimistic analysts who are also poor relative performers. The magnitude of the optimistic bias is large: 82.0% of appointed recommendations are strong-buy/buy recommendations, compared to 56.9% for all other analyst recommendations. We also show that appointed analysts' optimism is stronger at precisely those times when firms' benefits are larger. Lastly, we find that appointing firms are more likely to have management on the board nominating committee, appear to be poorly governed, and increase earnings management and CEO compensation following these board appointments.

Read the paper: http://www.people.hbs.edu/lcohen/pdffiles/malcofrazIII.pdf

Paying to Be Nice: Consistency and Costly Prosocial Behavior

Authors:Ayelet Gneezy, Alex Imas, Amber Brown, Leif D. Nelson, and Michael I. Norton
Publication:Management Science (forthcoming)
Abstract

Building on previous research in economics and psychology, we propose that the costliness of initial prosocial behavior positively influences whether that behavior leads to consistent future behaviors. We suggest that costly prosocial behaviors serve as a signal of prosocial identity and that people subsequently behave in line with that self-perception. In contrast, costless prosocial acts do not signal much about one's prosocial identity, so subsequent behavior is less likely to be consistent and may even show the reductions in prosocial behavior associated with licensing. The results of a laboratory experiment and a large field experiment converge to support our account.

Read the paper: http://www.people.hbs.edu/mnorton/gneezy%20et%20al%20in%20press.pdf

The Persuasive 'Power' of Stigma?

Authors:Michael I. Norton, Elizabeth W. Dunn, Dana R. Carney, and Dan Ariely
Publication:Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes (forthcoming)
Abstract

We predicted that able-bodied individuals and white Americans would have a difficult time saying no to persuasive appeals offered by disabled individuals and black Americans, due to their desire to make such interactions proceed smoothly. In two experiments, we show that members of stigmatized groups have a peculiar kind of persuasive ''power'' in face-to-face interactions with non-stigmatized individuals. In Experiment 1, wheelchair-bound confederates were more effective in publicly soliciting donations to a range of charities than confederates seated in a regular chair. In Experiment 2, whites changed their private attitudes more following face-to-face appeals from black than white confederates, an effect mediated by their increased efforts to appear agreeable by nodding and expressing agreement. This difference was eliminated when impression management concerns were minimized-when participants viewed the appeals on video.

Read the paper: http://www.people.hbs.edu/mnorton/norton dunn carney ariely.pdf

Foundations of Organizational Trust: What Matters to Different Stakeholders?

Authors:Michael Pirson and Deepak Malhotra
Publication:Organization Science 22, no. 4 (2011)
Abstract

Prior research on organizational trust has not rigorously examined the context specificity of trust nor distinguished between the potentially varying dimensions along which different stakeholders base their trust. As a result, dominant conceptualizations of organizational trust are overly generalized. Building on existing research on organizational trust and stakeholder theory, we introduce a more nuanced perspective on the nature of organizational trust. We develop a framework that distinguishes between organizational stakeholders along two dimensions: depth of the relationship (deep or shallow) and locus (internal or external). The framework identifies which of six dimensions of trustworthiness (benevolence, integrity, managerial competence, technical competence, transparency, and identification) will be relevant to which stakeholder type. We test the predictions of our framework using original survey data from 1,298 respondents across four stakeholder groups from four different organizations. The results reveal that the relevant dimensions of trustworthiness vary systematically across different stakeholder types and provide strong support for the validity of the depth and locus dimensions.

Working Papers

Sovereigns, Upstream Capital Flows and Global Imbalances

Authors:Laura Alfaro, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and Vadym Volosovych
Abstract

We decompose capital flows—both debt and equity—into public and private components and study their relationship with productivity growth. This exercise reveals that international capital flows are mainly shaped by government decisions and sovereign to sovereign transactions. Specifically, we show (1) international capital flows net of government debt are positively correlated with growth and allocated according to the neoclassical predictions; (2) international capital flows net of official aid flows, which are mostly accounted as debt, are also positively correlated with productivity growth consistent with the predictions of the neoclassical model; and (3) public debt flows are negatively correlated with growth only if government debt is financed by another sovereign and not by private lenders. Our results show that the failure to consider official flows as the main driver of uphill flows and global imbalances is an important shortcoming of the recent literature.

Download the paper: http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/12-009.pdf

No Margin, No Mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for Pro-Social Tasks

Authors:Nava Ashraf, Oriana Bandiera, and Kelsey Jack
Abstract

A substantial body of research investigates the design of incentives in firms, yet less is known about incentives in organizations that hire individuals to perform tasks with positive social spillovers. We conduct a field experiment in which agents hired by a public health organization are randomly allocated to four groups. Agents in the control group receive a standard volunteer contract often offered for this type of task, whereas agents in the three treatment groups receive small financial rewards, large financial rewards, and non-financial rewards, respectively. The analysis yields three main findings. First, non-financial rewards are more effective at eliciting effort than either financial rewards or the volunteer contract. The effect of financial rewards, both large and small, is orders of magnitude smaller and not significantly different from zero. Second, non-financial rewards elicit effort both by leveraging intrinsic motivation for the cause and by facilitating social comparison among agents. Third, contrary to existing laboratory evidence, financial incentives do not crowd out intrinsic motivation in this setting.

Download the paper: http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/12-008.pdf

Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation: The Case of Sponsor-Based Business Models

Authors:Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and Feng Zhu
Abstract

We study sponsor-based business model innovations where a firm monetizes its product through sponsors rather than setting prices to its customer base. We analyze strategic interactions between an innovative entrant and an incumbent where the incumbent may imitate the entrant's business model innovation once it is revealed. We find that an entrant needs to strategically choose whether to reveal its innovation by competing through the new business model or conceal it by adopting a traditional business model. We show that the value of business model innovation may be so substantial that an incumbent may prefer to compete in a duopoly rather than to remain a monopolist.

Download the paper: http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-003.pdf

Competing by Restricting Choice: The Case of Search Platforms

Authors:Hanna Hałaburda and Mikołaj Jan Piskorski
Abstract

We show that a two-sided platform can successfully compete by limiting the choice of potential matches it offers to its customers while charging higher prices than platforms with unrestricted choice. Starting from microfoundations, we find that increasing the number of potential matches not only has a positive effect due to larger choice, but also a negative effect due to competition between agents on the same side. Agents with heterogeneous outside options resolve the trade-off between the two effects differently. For agents with a lower outside option, the competitive effect is stronger than the choice effect. Hence, these agents have higher willingness to pay for a platform restricting choice. Agents with a higher outside option prefer a platform offering unrestricted choice. Therefore, the two platforms may coexist without the market tipping. Our model helps explain why platforms with different business models coexist in markets, including online dating, housing, and labor markets.

Download the paper: http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/10-098.pdf

Market Competition, Government Efficiency, and Profitability Around the World

Authors:Paul M. Healy, George Serafeim, Suraj Srinivasan, and Gwen Yu
Abstract

We examine how cross-country differences in product, capital, labor market competition, and government efficiency affect the rate of mean reversion of corporate profitability. Using a sample of 42,337 unique firms from 49 countries, we find that corporate profitability mean reverts faster in countries where product and capital markets are more competitive. Moreover, holding constant product, capital, and labor market competition we find that profitability mean reverts faster in countries with less efficient governments. The findings suggest that country-level factors have an economically significant impact on the rate of corporate profitability mean reversion. The study has implications for forecasting profitability and equity valuation in a global context.

Download the paper: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1865878

The Flexible Substitution Logit: Uncovering Category Expansion and Share Impacts of Marketing Instruments

Authors:Qiang Liu, Thomas J. Steenburgh, and Sachin Gupta
Abstract

Different instruments are relevant for different marketing objectives (category demand expansion or market share stealing). To help brand managers make informed marketing mix decisions, it is essential that marketing mix models appropriately measure the different effects of marketing instruments. Discrete choice models that have been applied to this problem might not be adequate because they possess the Invariant Proportion of Substitution (IPS) property, which imposes counter-intuitive restrictions on individual choice behavior. Indeed our empirical application to prescription writing choices of physicians in the hyperlipidemia category shows this to be the case. We find that three commonly used models that all suffer from the IPS restriction-the homogeneous logit model, the nested logit model, and the random coefficient logit model-lead to counterintuitive estimates of the sources of demand gains due to increased marketing investments in Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (DTCA), detailing, and Meetings and Events (M&E). We then propose an alternative choice model specification that relaxes the IPS property-the so-called "flexible substitution" logit (FSL) model. The (random coefficient) FSL model predicts that sales gains from DTCA and M&E come primarily from the non-drug treatment (87.4% and 70.2% respectively), whereas gains from detailing come at the expense of competing drugs (84%). By contrast, the random coefficient logit model predicts that gains from DTCA, M&E, and detailing all would come largely from competing drugs.

Download the paper: http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/12-012.pdf

Doing What the Parents Want? The Effect of the Local Information Environment on the Investment Decisions of Multinational Corporations

Authors:Nemit O. Shroff, Rodrigo S. Verdi, and Gwen Yu.
Abstract

This paper examines how the external information environment in which foreign subsidiaries operate affects investment decisions in multinational corporations (MNCs). We hypothesize and find that foreign subsidiaries in country-industries with more transparent information environments better translate the local growth opportunities into investments. This result is consistent with the information environment helping MNCs monitor the subsidiary's investment decision. Cross-sectional tests show that the effect is larger when there is greater "distance" between the parent and the subsidiary. Our results suggest that the external information environment helps mitigate agency problems that arise when firms expand their operations across borders. This paper contributes to the literature by showing that the external information environment helps MNCs mitigate information frictions within the firm.

Download the paper: http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/12-011.pdf

Cases & Course Materials

Lady Gaga (A)

Anita Elberse and Michael Christensen
Harvard Business School Case 512-016

In September 2009, Troy Carter, manager of up-and-coming pop star Lady Gaga, has to decide on a new course of action now that his artist's planned co-headlining arena tour with hip-hop superstar Kanye West has been cancelled. Carter knows that continuing the tour, but doing so solo, comes with huge risks, but scaling it back to smaller theaters or postponing the tour altogether has disadvantages as well. Making matters more complicated, Carter also has to consider the implications for Gaga's partners, including the concert promoter Live Nation and the William Morris Endeavor agency. What is the best strategy? Designed to help students understand the decisions that helped propel Lady Gaga into one of the entertainment world's biggest names. Written from the perspective of her manager, the case provides rich insights into the artist's touring, recorded-music, and social-media activities, as well as supporting economic data.

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Wii Encore?

Andrei Hagiu
Harvard Business School Case 712-416

Nintendo faced huge difficulties in July 2011. Sony's PlayStation and Microsoft's Xbox had caught up with the innovative motion-sensing controllers of the original Wii. And the new Nintendo 3DS handheld console had experienced a very disappointing start. Moreover, videogame consoles (particularly handheld ones) were facing increasing substitution from online and mobile games played on social networks and/or mobile phones (e.g. Zynga's Farmville). First, could Nintendo come up with a novel and innovative console once again (a Wii Encore) in order to escape head-to-head competition against its two larger rivals (Sony and Microsoft)? Second, how could Nintendo fend off the new substitutes, which were competing for a large portion of its customers?

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Game Time Decision for AppDirect

Andrei Hagiu, Laura Arjona, and Emily Zhang
Harvard Business School Case 712-410

AppDirect is a start-up that offers small businesses software-as-a-service solutions through a business app marketplace and portal. Daniel Saks, co-founder and co-CEO, is faced with the key question of deciding distribution strategy: should AppDirect find channel partners or create a self-branded platform? The case describes the evolving business app market by analyzing the strategies and business models of competitors for both the marketplace and portal products. The marketplace offers small businesses search, trial, and purchase of software-as-a-service apps for a wide range of business needs from customer management to human resources, while the portal service gives businesses the ability to manage all their apps in one place from user management to single sign-on. The case encourages discussion on the evolution and future direction of this nascent market.

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The Dannon Company: Marketing and Corporate Social Responsibility (B)

Christopher Marquis and Bobbi Thomason
Harvard Business School Supplement 412-047

Details Dannon's decision to initiate a cause marketing program focused on breast cancer to directly compete with Yoplait.

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Fighting a Dangerous Financial Fire: The Federal Response to the Crisis of 2007-2009

David Moss and Cole Bolton
Harvard Business School Case 711-104

By the summer of 2009, many observers concluded that a catastrophic financial collapse-which seemed all but imminent the previous fall and winter-had been averted. Although the recession had still yet to be declared over, and the economy's footing remained far from solid, many believed that the worst of the crisis was over. With the global financial system no longer spiraling into an abyss, government officials, business leaders, and American taxpayers could now take stock of where they had been and where they should be headed. In particular, many wondered how the disaster had happened in the first place: what exactly had caused the brutal financial crisis of 2007-2009?

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China and the Yuan-Dollar Exchange Rate

Aldo Musacchio
Harvard Business School Note 711-110

This note explains how the People's Bank of China (PBOC) manages (some say manipulates) the dollar-yuan exchange rate. It discusses briefly the process of sterilization in China and the possible costs for the PBOC. Therefore, the note summarizes some of the main challenges the PBOC faces to contain inflation in China and to keep Chinese exports competitive.

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The Clorox Company: Leveraging Green for Growth

Elie Ofek and Lauren Barley
Harvard Business School Case 512-009

The Clorox Company needs to decide on the marketing strategy going forward for its three sustainable brands, Brita, Burt's Bees, and Green Works. These brands had fared differently over the past three years, and each presents multiple courses of action heading into 2011. Management also needs to assess the role the sustainable brands play in Clorox's overall Corporate Responsibility strategy and the implications they have for the other brands (such as Clorox Bleach, 409, and Hidden Valley). The company has set aggressive financial targets in light of its upcoming centennial in 2013. Students need to evaluate whether sustainability is an enduring trend that Clorox should embrace for future growth or whether focusing on its core brands, which currently represent 90% of sales, is a better approach.

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The Expansion of Ping An

Robert C. Pozen and Nina J. Yang
Harvard Business School Case 311-133

In June 2010, Mingzhe Ma, chairman and chief executive officer of Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China ("Ping An" or "the Company"), sat down with Sun Jianyi, vice chief executive officer and executive vice president at Ping An, to discuss the future direction of the Company. They would have to answer questions at the upcoming shareholder meeting about Ping An's financial strategy for diversification within China and globally. Ping An had been founded by Ma in 1988 and had since grown into China's second largest life insurer. While Ping An had achieved past success in insurance, it looked to expand its business going forward. Ping An's ambition was to transform itself into a global financial conglomerate, with banking and investment, as well as insurance operations. Ping An's recent efforts at globalization and diversification had been challenging. In a highly publicized transaction, Ping An made an untimely investment in Fortis, a large European bank, which failed in the global financial crisis in 2008. Ping An spent close to 24 billion Chinese yuan (RMB) or 3.4 billion U.S. dollars ($) on Fortis. In the aftermath of the Fortis acquisition, Ping An had halted overseas expansion and focused on opportunities at home in mainland China.

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Ford Motor Company: Strengthening the Dealer Network

V. Kasturi Rangan, Katharine Lee, and Marie Bell
Harvard Business School Case 511-132

The case describes a five-year effort (2006-2011) of distribution rationalization and consolidation at Ford. The financial crisis in the second half of 2008 forced GM and Chrysler into bankruptcy. Having completed the distribution overhaul work by 2011, its senior managers wondered how the transformed distribution channel would meet the needs of its new product strategy developed in response to the financial crisis.

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